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IMPLEMENTING GOVERNMENTAL POLICY AGAINST
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: FAIR
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE LAWS, TITLE VII,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,
AND THE PHILADELPHIA PLAN
The federal government' and most states2 have a clear policy against
racial discrimination in employment, but whether the law can effectively
facilitate the implementation of this policy is a difficult question. Both
informal conciliation and formal coercive measures have been used to implement the policy; yet the effectiveness of these efforts has been minimal,3 and
a complete analysis of government anti-discrimination programs requires
consideration of improved methods of enforcement.
The complexity of combating discrimination in employment is apparent
when one considers that despite numerous state and federal anti-discrimination laws and many favorable court decisions, the general position of non4
whites in the employment market has not improved since World War II.
Since 1955 the unemployment rate among nonwhites has remained roughly
"vice the rate for whites.5 Proportionately, more than twice as many whites
as nonwhites are classified as white-collar workers, 6 and the median income
of nonwhite families is only about 62 per cent that of white families. 7
Employment discrimination is graphically revealed by an examination of the
percentage of nonwhites in selected occupations: architects 2.3 per cent,
engineers 1.7 per cent, apprentices 3.1 per cent, charwomen and janitors 38.5
per cent, and private household workers 48.4 per cent.
Discrimination in employment takes two forms: (1) minority group
members are excluded from a particular labor market, either by a denial of
union membership or by an employer's unilateral refusal to hire nonwhites;
and (2) within particular labor markets, blacks are relegated to the lowest
paying, most menial jobs. 9 Either form of racial discrimination is particularly
invidious because better jobs are a prerequisite for improving the black's
position in society. Even a superficial analysis reveals that employment
discrimination is intertwined with parallel problems of racial discrimination
in housing, education, and voting. 0 For example, even if good, nonsegregated
1. See Exec. Order No. 11,478, §1, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1970).
2. See state statutes cited note 12 infra. Thirty-eight states have statutes dealing with

racial discrimination in employment.
3. See Note, A "New" Weapon To Combat Racial Discrimination in Employment: The
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 29 ID. L. REv. 158, 166 (1969).
4. Morse, The Scope of Judicial Relief Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
46 TExAS L. Ra,. 516, 517 (1968).
5. U.S. BuRFIu OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr OF TE UNITED STATES 213 (90th
ed. 1969).
6. Id. at 223.
7. Id. at 330.

8. Id. at 224.
9. Garfinkle & Cahn, Racial-Religious Designations, Preferential Hiring, and Fair Employment Practices Commissions, 20 LAB. L.J. 357, 858 (1969).
10. See M. SovERN,

LEGAL RESTRAINTS

ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

IN

EMPLOYMENT 5-6

(1966).
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housing and educational facilities are available, economic necessity forces
unemployed or low-salaried blacks to live in poor, predominately black
neighborhoods.,
The social deprivation resulting from patterns of discrimination in housing and education severely handicaps the black worker
in his search for better jobs. Furthermore, the traditional discrimination
against poor blacks in voter registration contributes to the inability of the
black community to elect officials sympathetic to its needs.
This note will analyze several methods used by state and federal governments in their effort to remedy the effects of employment discrimination.
State fair-employment-practices laws are discussed, with particular emphasis
on the effectiveness of the "commission methods" employed by the statutes.
Federal involvement in this area is surveyed, with an examination of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the effectiveness of its present provisions,
and possible improvements. The impact of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) in the area of employment discrimination is considered, and
finally, the operation of "affirmative action" programs such as the Philadelphia Plan is analyzed.
STATE FAIR-EMPLOYMENT PRACncEs

LEGISLATION

Thirty-eight states presently have legislation dealing with racial discrimination in employment.12 Typically, these statutes are contained within
provisions dealing with labor and employment relations or within statutes
setting up human rights commissions. Most of the statutes are at least

11.

See

J.

WITHERSPOON, ADMINISTRATiVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RiIGS

128 (1968).

12. ALASKA STAT. §§23.10, .190-.235 (1962); ARaZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§41-1461 et. seq.
(Supp. 1965); CAL. LABOR CODE §§1410-33 (West Supp. 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§80-21-1
et seq. (Supp. 1970); CONN. GErN. STAT. REV. §31-126 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§§710-13 (1960); HAWAII REV. LAWS §378-2 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§18-7301 to -7303
(Supp. 1970); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, §§851 et seq. (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. §§40-2307
et seq. (Supp. 1970); IowA CODE §105A.7 (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§44-1001 to -08
(Supp. 1970); Ky. REV. STAT. §§344.040 et seq. (Supp. 1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§861 (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§17-20 (Supp. 1969); MASS. GEN. LAWs Ch.
151B, §4 (Supp. 1970); MICH. ComP. LAWS §423.301 (Supp. 1970); MINN. STAT. §363.03 (1)
(Supp. 1970); Mo. REV. STAT. §§296.010-.070 (Supp. 1970); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§64-301 et seq. (1969); NE. REV. STAT. §§48-1101 et seq. (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. §233.010.080 (Supp. 1970); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§354-A:1 et seq. (Supp. 1970); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§18-25-1 et seq. (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. §4-33-7 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. ExEC. LAW §§290-301
(McKinney 1951); OHIO REV. CODE §4112.02 (Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§1301
et seq. (Supp. 1969); OR. REV. STAT. §659.030 (1968); PA. STAT. tit. 43, §951-53 (Supp. 1970);
R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§28-1 et seq. (Supp. 1970); S.D. COMPILED LAws §§1-31-1 to 1-31-8
(Supp. 1969); UTAH CODE ANN. §§34-35-1 et seq. (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §495
(Supp. 1970); WASH. REV. CODE §49.60.010-320 (1958); W. VA. CODE ANN. §5-11-9A (Supp.
1969); Wis. STAT. §§111.31 et seq. (Supp. 1970); WYo. STAT. ANN. §27-261 (1967). The
pattern is interesting -virtually every state outside "the South" (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia) has enacted a fair employment law. The lone exception is North Dakota, which
has only 777 nonwhites out of a population of 620,315. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
supra note 5, at 28.
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partially based 3 on the New York Fair Employment Practices Law14 passed
in 1945. Generally, the statutes establish a commission15 to deal with problems of discrimination.,' The proscribed discriminatory practices are listed,'7
remedial procedures outlined, s and provisions are made for judicial enforcement of commission orders.' 0
The principal measure employed by state commissions to eliminate racial
discrimination in employment is the processing of individual charges of
discriminatory practices. 20 Upon receiving a complaint, the commission
initiates an investigation, which is usually conducted by a field representative.
From this investigation a determination is made whether probable cause
exists 2' for believing that the employer or union concerned has in fact discriminated against the complainant. 22 If probable cause is found, the commission enters into conciliatory negotiations designed to induce voluntary
cessation of the offender's discriminatory practices. 23 Most cases involving
probable cause end in a conciliation agreement; 24 in those that do not, a
public hearing is held to determine whether the employer violated the fair
employment act.' 5 If the employer or union is found guilty of discrimination, the commission will issue a remedial order,2 which may be judicially
7
enforced.'
These procedures allow state authorities to deal with the problems of
employment discrimination without federal intervention.' 8 The desirability
of state action in this regard is recognized in Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,2 9 which requires initial deferral to state procedures in cases

arising in jurisdictions covered by state fair-employment legislation. 30 Addi13. M. SovE.N, supra note 10, at 19.
14. N.Y. Exrc. LAw §§290-301 (McKinney 1951).
15. E.g., Civil Rights Commission (Mich.); Fair Employment Practices Commission
(N.M.).
16. These Commissions vary from state to state in their jurisdiction, powers of enforcement, and size, among other characteristics. For a comprehensive breakdown of some 33 of
these statutes concerning coverage, commission descriptions, and budgets see J. WrrBEasOON,
supra note 11, at 505-28.
17. E.g., Wis. STAT. §111.36 (1965).
18. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE §§1421-26, 1429 (West Supp. 1970).
19. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §31-128 (1958).
20. E.g., N.Y. Exac. LAw §297 (1) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
21. This determination is generally made by the single commissioner assigned to the
case, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. §296.040(2) (1961). See also M. Sovrn, supra note 10, at 23.
22.

J. WrrHRooN, supra note 11, at 110.

23. Note, The Right to Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement of Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 74 HARv. L. REv. 526, 540-47 (1961).
24. M. SovmN, supra note 10, at 25.
25. E.g., N.Y. ExEC. LAw §297 (2) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
26. Cease-and-desist orders, reinstatement, hiring the complainant, and awards of back
pay are among the remedial actions the commission may order. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE
§1426 (West Supp. 1970); IND. STAT. §40-2313 (e) (1965).
27. E.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAw §298 (McKinney Supp. 1970).
28. See M. SovRmN, supra note 10, at 92.
29. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §706 (b), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (b) (1964).
30. Note, Discrimination in Employmenf and in Housing: Private Enforcement Pro-
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tionally, the extensive use of conciliation procedures may preclude the necessity of litigation in many instances. 31 Nevertheless, the persistence of racial
discrimination in employment practices demonstrates the ineffectiveness of
present state legislation, even in areas where state commissions have concen32
trated their efforts.
The inadequacy of state legislation has been caused by several factors,
the most common being the failure to fund commission activities adequately.33 Furthermore, jurisdictional limitations within the statutes, such as
those limiting their applicability to employers who have more than a
specified number of employees,34 restrict the commissions' authority and
therefore their effectiveness.35 A third factor is the failure of some states to
grant commissions the power to initiate enforcement proceedings, 8 and even
where such powers are granted many commissions demonstrate an unwillingness to utilize them. 37 The failure of the states to develop government-wide
programs of effective anti-discrimination measures also hampers commission
operation. Without help from other state agencies in a coordinated program,
the commissions carry the entire burden of the anti-discrimination effort.35
Even where these limiting factors are less acute, as in New York, 39 racial
discrimination in employment has remained substantially impervious to the
efforts of the state commissions. Many states40 have statutory provisions that,
on their faces, are adequate to combat employment discrimination.41 In such
states effective anti-discrimination policies could be realized by: the appointment of aggressive commission members,4 2 a coordinated government-wide
state program to aid the commission in combating discrimination, 4 3 vigorous
support by the state executive, and an intensive educational campaign to
inform minority group members of their rights and to induce them to voice
44
their grievances.
Another effective measure would be a requirement that minority groups
be equally represented in all state funded projects, 45 in much the same manvisions
31.
32.
33.

of the, Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1968, 82 HA~v. L. REv. 834, 842 (1969).
M. SoVERN, supra note 10, at 25.
See Note, supra note 3, at 166. But see M. SOVERN, supra note 10, at 60.
M. SovERN, supra note 10, at 40-41.

34. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §852 (d) (Supp. 1970) (25 employees).
35. Note, supra note 3, at 167-68.
36. See ARI. REv. STAT. ANN. §§41-1461 et seq. (Supp. 1965).
37.

See Blumrosen, AntidiscriminationLaws in Action in New Jersey: A Law-Sociology

Study, 19 RuTGERS L. Rlv. 189, 246 (1965).
38. M. SOVERN, supra note 10, at 53-55.
39. The New York Commission is generally considered the most effective state agency in
combating discrimination, enjoying, among other advantages, the largest budget of any of
the state commissions -$1,693,000 in 1965. J. WrrHERSpOON, supra note 11, at 206-07, 519.
40. E.g., New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania.
41.

Note, Remedies Available to a Victim of Employment Discrimination, 29 OHlo

ST. L.J. 456, 472 (1968).
42. See M. SovERN, supra note 10, at 59.
43.

Id. at 53.

44. Id. at 26-31.
45. This requirement could probably be imposed by legislation or by an order of the
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ner as the anti-discrimination program in federal projects administered by the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC).46 Through the exercise of its
police power the state might also impose an "affirmative action" requirement
on employers not dealing with the state - requiring all employers and unions
to take positive steps to end racial discrimination against employees.47
Compliance with these requirements could be monitored through periodic
reports, possibly in conjunction with licensing requirements, or through spot
4
checking. 8
A state "affirmative action" requirement is not as radical as it may appear.
An Ohio court held constitutional an executive order by the Governor
requiring that contractors bidding on state funded projects affirmatively
demonstrate preparation for and readiness to comply with the state antidiscrimination laws.49 Other state provisions extending the applicability of
anti-discrimination laws to all state funded activities should likewise be held
valid."0 The California Fair Employment Practice Commission recently
stated: 51
[M]ore than passive compliance with the letter of the California Fair
Employment Practice Act is essential .... [T]he spirit of the law calls
for a dynamic and comprehensive program of affirmative opportunity
to be sustained by employers on a high priority basis.
Strong state fair-employment-practices laws are essential in eradicating
employment discrimination,52 but despite a pressing need Florida has no such

Governor. See Executive order of the Governor of Ohio, June 5, 1967, 12 RAcE REL. L. REP.
1677 (1967).
46. See notes 254-266 infra and accompanying text.
47. Such a measure would arguably bear the requisite close relationship to the health,
safety, morals, and general welfare of the public to justify the exercise of the police power.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 has also been held to bar all private discrimination in employment. Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968). Since Congress
can provide a judicial remedy through the proper exercise of its powers, the state legislature
should be able to provide an administrative remedy through the proper exercise of its own

powers.
48. See M. SovERN, supra note 10, at 39-40. For a fuller discussion of legal issues involved
in such an "affirmative action" requirement, see text accompanying notes 289-316 infra.
See also Spitz, Tailoring the Techniques To Eliminate and Prevent Employment Discrimination, 14 Bnr'Ao L. REv. 79, 96-97 (1964), for discussion of the use of licensing require-

ments.
49. Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 15 Ohio Misc. 298, 304, 238 N.E.2d
839, 845 (C.C.P. Cuyahoga County, Ohio 1968), aff'd, 19 Ohio SL, 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907
(1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
50. These provisions might well be similar to those found in Exec. Order No. 11,246, as
amended, 3 C.F.R. 406 (1969), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. III, 1967) and Exec. Order No. 11,478,
3 C.F.R. 133 (Supp. 1969). See generally Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629
(5th Cir. 1967).
51. In re International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 12 (Cal. F.E.P. Comm'n
No. FEP64-B333 OLA 11822), 12 RecE RE. L. REP. 1697, 1699 (1967).
52. See generally Floyd & Doherty, Complaint Processing Under the Kansas Act Against
Discrimination,18 KAN. L. REv. 127 (1969).
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legislation.53 If inadequacies existing in other acts are avoided 4 a strong
Fair Employment Practices (FEP) Commission with appropriate enforcement powers could significantly reduce employment discrimination in Florida.
Adequately funded and leading a coordinated government-wide effort
against employment discrimination, such a commission could avoid the
problems experienced by other states and ameliorate the adverse effects of
entrenched discriminatory employment practices. Aggressive investigation of
alleged discrimination coupled with mandatory deferral procedures (outlined below in Title VII) would make a Florida FEP Commission an
effective agency. 55
Ti=L VII OF THE CIvIL RIGHTS Acr oF 1964
Title VII 51 is the first modern 5 7 federal legislation aimed at ensuring
equal employment opportunity to minority groups and is the only title of the
1964 Act that has nationwide application. 8
Title VII Procedures

As with most state fair employment laws, Tide VII is basically a commission type statute. Section 705 of the Act sets up the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as the agency primarily responsible for
effecting compliance with the Act.59 The Act includes broad prohibitions
against various forms of discrimination, ° but its scope is restricted 0 ' in that
it covers only employers of more than twenty-five persons and has several
important exclusions s 2 The commission process starts when a sworn written

53. The Florida unemployment rates for nonwhites are similar to the national rates:
In 1970 the estimated unemployment rate for male nonwhites between the ages of 25 and
54 was 7.3%- for the similar white group the rate was 4.6%. The projection of unemployment rates for 1980 reflects a nonwhite rate of 7.1% and a white rate of 3.9%. U. FLA.
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS ADMINIsrRATION BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS RESEARCH, FLORMA

STATLrICAL ABsTRACr 1969 (1969). Strong fair employment legislation might also aid the
migratory farm workers, especially Negroes or Mexican-Americans, in bettering some of the
deplorable working conditions in Florida. See Gomez v. Florida State Employment Serv.,
417 F.2d 569, 572-73 (5th Cir, 1969).
54. See J. WITERPSOON, supra note 11, at 123-32 and text accompanying notes 33-34
supra.
55. See generally M. SovmuN, supra note 10, at 60.

56. 78 Stat. 255 (1964), 42 U.S.C. §§2000e et seq. (1964).
57. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. §1931 (1964).
58. J. WrRSsPOON, supra note 11, at 13.

59. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-4 (1964). The Commission is composed of five members appointed
by the President. 42 U.S.C. §20003e4 (1964).
60.

42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (1964).

61. Title VII has been estimated to cover only 8% of the country's employers. M.
SovERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 65 (1966).
62. 42 U.S.C. §2000e (b) (1964). Included among these exclusions is government employment; however, Executive Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1969), forbids racial discrimination in federal government employment.
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charge is filed 63 alleging that the complainant has-been aggrieved by some
unlawful employment practice 4 as set forth in sections 703 and 704 of the
Act.6 5 If an investigation-o shows probable cause, the Commission must seek
the offender's voluntary compliance with the provisions of the Act.6 7 If the
conciliation efforts are not successful within sixty days after the complaint is
filed, the EEOC must notify the complainant, who then has thirty days to
sue the discriminator in federal district court.68
The purpose of the time limitations is to ensure that violations of the
Act are speedily remedied. However, a strict reading of these limitations
can cause injustice and may allow many violations to remain uncorrected.69
It has been held, for example, that an actual conciliation attempt by the
EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit under Title VII in federal
court.7 0 This interpretation of section 706 (e) could result in a complainant
being delayed many months waiting for administrative action on his complaint because of the EEOC backlog.71 Moreover, the complainant may be
subjected to further discriminatory action as retaliation for filing the complaint.72 In addition, it has been argued that the thirty-day period in which
the complainant may bring suit begins to run sixty days after the charge has
been filed, regardless of whether or not the EEOC's notice of failure to
effect voluntary compliance has been received. Failure to act within this
period will bar the daim73
The weight of authority, however, indicates that Title VII provisions
should be read broadly-4 to interpret the time provisions as directory rather
63. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (a) (1964). This charge must be filed within 90 days after the

alleged unlawful employment practice occurred. Id. §2000e-5 (d).
64. See 29 C.F.R. §1601.11 (1970) (specific items that must be included on the charge).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2, -3 (1964).
66. Under the provisions of §706 (a) the commission is required to investigate the
charge, but the present backlog of complaints is so large that many are never investigated
at all. See note 71 infra and accompanying text.
67. Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645, 651 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 918 (1969); 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (a) (1964).
68. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (e) (1964).
69. See Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 271 F. Supp. 27, 29 (E.D.N.C. 1967).

70. Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1967), rev'd, 406

F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969).
71. Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HAuv. L. RPv. 834, 849 (1969) (backlog

period now well over one year).
72. Under §706 (a) of the Act, the EEOC must furnish the employer charged with discrimination a copy of the charge as soon as it is filed. A long hiatus before investigation of
the charge could give a recalcitrant employer or union time to dismiss the dissident
employee on some pretext. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998 (5th
Cir. 1969) (employee discharged for filing charge with EEOC).
73. See Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 285-87 (5th Cir. 1969) (argument
rejected by court). Under this rationale a complaint would be barred from any judicial
remedy under Title VII if suit were not brought within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, even if the delay were caused by overloads in the EEOC over which the complainant
had no control.
74. See United States v. Medical Soc'y of South Carolina, 298 F. Supp. 145, 151 (D.S.C.

1969).
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than mandatory in nature. 75 Courts have recognized that interaction of the
filing requirement 6 with the short statutory time period and the inability
of EEOC to process charges promptly (because of the complaint backlog)
can work a severe hardship on complainants.77 Thus, the courts should necessarily base many of their judgments on the broad policies of Title VII rather
than on a strict, literal reading of the statute.78
Interaction of Title VII Procedures and State Procedures
When an alleged discriminatory act occurs in a state where there is an
applicable state or local law prohibiting employment discrimination, the
state or local procedure must be employed before that of the EEOC 9 Where
such laws exist, the complainant cannot file a charge with the EEOC80 until
the state agency has had an opportunity to deal with the problem."' The
statute of limitation for filing with the EEOC in these cases is extended
considerably.8 2
In order to qualify for such a deferral by the EEOC, the state or local
law must be applicable-that is, it must be acceptable under Title VII
standards. Most state laws meet this criteria because they are generally more
comprehensive in coverage and contain more effective enforcement procedures. Determining whether local ordinances meet Title VII requirements is
more difficult because copies of the ordinances are not usually filed with the
EEOC. In such situations, a presumption of deferability arises; and the
charge is deferred to the local authority unless it is obvious that, because of
deficiencies in the ordinance, the local agency lacks jurisdiction over the complaint.8 3 Where both state and local laws could govern the complaint, the

75. E.g., Everett v. Trans-World Airlines, 298 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
76. The complainant must first file a charge with the EEOC before commencing judicial
action. Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1969); Mickel v. South
Carolina State Employment Serv., 377 F.2d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 1967).
77. E.g., Pullen v. Otis Elevator, Co., 292 F. Supp. 715, 717 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
78. See Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. RE'V. 1598, 1614

(1969).
79. See 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-5 (b), (c), (d) (1964).
80. This provision is also applied when an EEOC Commissioner files a charge under
§706 (a) of the Act. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (c) (1964).
81. The complainant cannot file with the EEOC until 60 days after the case has been
referred to the state agency, unless the proceedings are terminated earlier by the state.
Local 5, IBEW v. EEOC, 398 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1968). This 60-day period is extended to
120 days during the first year of operation of the state or local provision, 42 U.S.C.
§2000e-5 (b) (1964).
82. Under these circumstances the complainant has 210 days from the date of the
alleged discrimination to file with the EEOC, instead of the normal 90 days. 42 U.S.C.

§2000e-5 (d) (1964).
83. Rosen, Division of Authority Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964:
A Preliminary Study in Federal-State Interagency Relations, 34 Gao. WASH. L. R.y. 846,

858-59 (1966).
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EEOC will probably defer to the state rather than to the local agency as a
matter of policy.8 '
The different time limits for filing complaints often create confusion.
An individual usually will not consider whether his grievance is governed
by state law, and thus may inadvertently allow the applicable federal time
limit to expire. The EEOC has recognized this problem and has provided
that when a complaint arising in a state jurisdiction having an applicable
law is filed too late to give the state agency the full statutory period to deal
with the complaint,5 the EEOC will treat the charge as properly filed on the
federal level within the statutory period unless notified otherwise.8 6 There
are various situations, however, in which the possibility of confusion remains;
such situations may be fairly resolved only by a broad, liberal reading of the
87
deferral provisions.
Effectiveness of Conciliation
Title VII reflects a congressional intent to attack discriminatory employment practices by first seeking voluntary compliance by discriminators;88
thus, the EEOC must be allowed to attempt conciliation before any party
commences suit.8 9 Most authorities, however, consider the EEOC's conciliation attempts to have been ineffective from the beginning,90 and increasingly
less effective each year.81 Statistics show that, of more than 16,000 charges
received by the EEOC, only 488 were successfully or partially resolved by
conciliation in the two-year period 1967-1968.92
The main reason for this ineffectiveness is the unwillingness of employers
and labor organizations to end discriminatory employment practices voluntarily.0 3 Unlike most state commissions, the EEOC lacks power to impose
settlement on either party. 9' It cannot issue cease-and-desist orders, nor can
it seek judicial enforcement of its attempts to end discrimination. 95 In addition, the reluctance, even of qualified minority group members, to apply

84. Id. at 858 n.78.
85. 29 C.F.R. §1601.12 (1970).
86. Id. §1601.12 (b) (1) (v).

87. See generally Rosen, supra note 83, at 859-65.
88. Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645, 651 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 918 (1969).
89. Dent v. St. Louis- San Francisco Ry., 406 F.2d 399, 402 (5th Cir. 1969).
90. E.g., Note, Remedies Available to a Victim of Employment Discrimination, 29 OnIo
ST. L.J. 456, 477 (1968).
91.

Morse, The Scope of Judicial Relief Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 46 TExAs L. REV. 516 (1968).
92. Note, supra note 90, at 479, citing Hearings on S. 1308 Before the Subcomm. on
Employment, Manpower, and Poverty of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,

90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 54-55 (1967).
93. McKersie, Comments on Equal Employment: Problems and Prospects, 16 LAn. L.J.
468, 471 (1965); Negro Admissions into Apprenticeships, 55 L.R.R.M. 43, 44 (1964).

94. Note, supra note 71, at 849.
95. See 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-4, 5 (1964).
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for formerly "white" jobs96 and to seek redress when victimized by discrimination, 9 7 reduces the effectiveness of the Commission. 98 Lack of adequate
financing and staffing to cope with its responsibilities has also handicapped
the EEOC. One successful conciliation effort took almost an entire year and
committed a major portion of the resources of the EEOC.90 Necessarily,
many other cases were left unresolved.
Many other factors limit the impact of the EEOC. Political pressure
may discourage EEOC officials from aggressively combating employment
discrimination. 0 0 The scarcity of blacks qualified for promotion and difficult
questions of seniority between black and incumbent white employees also
complicate the conciliation process. 1' 1 Further, as blatant discriminatory
practices are eliminated, more sophisticated methods develop to perpetuate
control of specified jobs and the advancement of minority group members. 10 2
Many of the above problems are inherent in the commission system and
will exist as long as the requirement for EEOC conciliation continues. A
significant increase in finances available to the Commission, however, would
be an immediate improvement. This increase should include funding of an
intensive and imaginative educational campaign designed to acquaint blacks
1 3
with employment opportunities and methods for redress of grievances.
The relative paucity of complaints to the EEOC and the lack of qualified
blacks to fill available opportunities is understandable when it is considered
that after years of discrimination, blacks lack education, experience, and
motivation. The interaction of employment, housing, and educational discrimination has created an isolated subculture among blacks, and under

96. Morse, supra note 91, at 529.
97. Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 22

L. Rv. 465, 466 (1968).
98. This problem is also experienced by state commissions. See J. WrrHE.srooN, ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CAVIL RIGHTs 158-61 (1968).
RurGEs

99. See Blumrosen, The Newport News Agreement- One Brief Shining Moment in
the Enforcement of Equal Employment Opportunity, 1968 U. Ill. L.F. 269.
100. Id. at 295.

101. Id. at 272. The seniority problems between Negroes seeking rapid advancement
to positions previously denied them and incumbent white employees are difficult in themselves and are outside the scope of this note. For analyses of whether Title VII operates
retroactively to forbid present seniority systems that are non-discriminatory on their face
but act to perpetuate effects of past discrimination see, e.g., Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal
Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RuTERas L. REv. 268 (1969); Gould,
Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections on Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEXAs L.
REv. 1039 (1969). See also Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.
Va. 1968).

102. Morse, supra note 91, at 518. For example, elaborate restrictions concerning admissions to apprenticeship programs in the building trades have grown up that have almost
completely barred minority group members from these trades. See Lefkowitz v. Farrel, 9
RAcE Ra. L. RaP. 393 (1964).
103.

M.

SOVERN,
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ON
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83 (1966).
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normal circumstances information about new job opportunities reaches the
04
black community slowly.
Without the power to issue cease-and-desist orders and the power to seek
enforcement through federal courts, the EEOC cannot significantly increase
its effectiveness.1 05 The lack of success through the conciliation process
indicates a need for greater coercive power in the EEOC.100 While granting
cease-and-desist powers to the Commission would alter the basic thrust of
Title VII from a search for voluntary compliance to reliance on the agency's
coercive powers, there is little doubt that such a change would render the
conciliation process more effective.10 7 The possibility of applying legal force
would arguably influence recalcitrant discriminators to comply voluntarily
with the substantive provisions of Title VII.
The conciliation process does have advantages: it is less disruptive of
social activity than formal proceedings and it gives the discriminator the
opportunity to respond privately. 10 It often avoids litigation, thus sparing
the courts extra burdens, and in some cases it remedies discriminatory
policy at no expense to the complainant.109 However, current EEOC conciliation is not successful enough to justify its unmodified retention.10 Bills
have been filed in Congress that would improve the operation of the EEOC
by giving it cease-and-desist power, but these have languished in committee. 11
Such proposed legislation should be reexamined because substantial changes
in the conciliation process must be made if it is to become effective.
Effect of Filing and Conciliation Requirements on Judicial Actions
Under Title VII
As previously discussed, if the EEOC fails to effect voluntary compliance
within sixty days after receiving a complaint, the complainant may sue in
federal court within thirty days after notification of this failure." 2 The
effect of prior governmental activity, or lack of it, on a subsequent court
action under Title VII has been the subject of considerable litigation and
discussion.
One case held that an actual conciliation attempt was a jurisdictional
prerequisite to filing suit, 1 3 but the present view seems to require only two
prerequisites to a civil action under Title VII: (1) the complainant must
file a complaint with the EEOC and the courts within prescribed time
104. McKersie, supra note 93, at 470.
105. Lambert, Affirmative Action: A Robin Hood Hiring Policy in Federally Aided
Construction,2 PROSPECrUS 183, 185-86 (1968).
106. Rosen, supra note 83, at 891.
107. Note, supra note 71, at 847.
108. See Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 188 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
109. Note, supra note 71, at 846-47.
110. See J. W1rrasmooN, supra note 98, at 16-18.
111. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REc. 2862 (1969).
112. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (e) (1964).
113. Dent v. St. Louis- San Francisco Ry., 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1967), rev'd, 406
F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1969).
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limits;"1 and (2) he must receive notice from the EEOC that it has not
obtained voluntary compliance. 115 Courts have generally rejected suggestions
that Title VII provides direct access to the courts" 6 even though there is
no specific language in the statute to this effect."'7 Moreover, the issues
raised in such a suit must be "limited to that range of issues reasonably
related to and growing out of the original charge of discrimination" filed
with the EEOC.118 Defendants have argued that failure of the EEOC to
effect compliance either bars the action or constitutes a defense to it, but
these arguments have been rejected."19
A more complex problem is presented when the suit is brought as a class
action. 20 Class actions are uniquely adapted to Title VII enforcement, not
only because discrimination is necessarily class-directed, but also because
such actions permit a privately-instituted suit to further the public interest
of eliminating discriminatory employment practices.' 2, However, when the
class 122 contains members who have not complied with the filing requirements
of section 706 (a) of the Act a question arises concerning what relief, if any,
the nonfiling members may obtain.
23
Such nonfilers may be members of the class for injunctive purposes;
that is, any injunctive relief will apply to all members. However, courts
have consistently refused to grant affirmative relief 124 on such a basis,
limiting its availability to those parties that previously filed with the EEOC. 25
It has been argued that the limited availability of affirmative class action
relief under Title VII may work injustice because of the res judicata effect

114. See 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-5 (d), (e) (1964).
115. Johnson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 405 F.2d 645, 652 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 918 (1969); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 271 F. Supp. 27, 29 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
116. E.g., Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 910, rehearingdenied, 390 U.S. 976 (1967).
117. Note, supra note 71, at 853.
118. Logan v. General Fireproofing Co., 309 F. Supp. 1096, 1101 (W.D.N.C. 1969). See
Sciaraffa v. Oxford Paper Co., 310 F. Supp. 891, 897 (D. Me. 1970).
119. E.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
120. See Fpm. R. Crv. P. 23.
121. Note, Employment Opportunity: Class Membership for Title VII Action not
Restricted to PartiesPreviously Filing Charges with the EEOC, 1968 DuKa L.J. 1000, 1003.
122. FE. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) provides 4 criteria for the determination of whether a proper

class exists: (1) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there must be questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims and defenses
of the representative parties must be typical of the claims and defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties must be able to protect the interests of the class fairly and
adequately. The makeup of the class is flexible: see Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968) (blacks within a particular department held a class); Hall v.
Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966) (all black employees within a
plant held to constitute a class); cf. Lefkowitz v. Farrel, 9 RAc REL. L. REP. 393 (1964)
(applicants as a class).
123. Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
124. Reinstatement, hiring and back pay are specifically mentioned in §706(g) as
examples of affirmative relief, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (g) (1964).
125. Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
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of the class action judgment. 126 The judgment in an action for affirmative
relief is binding on a nonfiling plaintiff if the action also seeks injunctive
relief' 27 since the nonfiling party, a class member for injunctive purposes,
is bound by the collateral estoppel effect of the judgment. 128 In other words,
if the filing class members are held not to be entitled to the affirmative relief
sought, the nonfiling members are barred from seeking affirmative relief for
their individual grievances. This result seems harsh when considering that
the nonfiler cannot share in any affirmative relief the class may obtain.
Attorney General's Suits Under Section 707
In addition to the power granted under Title VII to intervene in a
29
the United States Atprivate civil suit on recommendation of the EEOC,
torney General may bring a civil action to halt discriminatory practices
either upon notification by the EEOC or upon finding a "pattern or practice
of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured" by Title
31
VII. 1 0 This power, however, has apparently been used sparingly.'
The power granted the Attorney General under section 707 of the Act
could be one of the most effective federal weapons against discriminatory
practices. One authority has stated that the character and priorities of the
Attorney General are an important factor in determining whether the Act
will ultimately be effective, 132 and his willingness to utilize the section 707
power could spell the swift end of many discriminatory practices.
Unlike private actions under section 706, it is not a prerequisite to a
section 707 suit that a charge first be filed with the EEOC.' 3 Section 707
allows expeditious attack on flagrant cases of racial discrimination in employment opportunity,2 4 and proper utilization of this section should permit
quicker resolution of discrimination problems than is ordinarily the case in
Title VII actions.123 The power of the Attorney General under this section,130 therefore, should be fully exploited.

126. Note, supra note 121, at 1004.
127. W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
128. Note, supra note 121, at 1004.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§572 (1961).

129. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-4 (f) (6) (1964).
130. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-6 (a) (1964).
131. J. WTHERSPOON, supra note 98, at 17. During the years 1965-1966 only one suit was
filed by the Attorney General. Id.
132. M. SovrRN, supra note 103, at 81.
133. United States v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 271 F. Supp. 447, 453 (E.D.
Mo. 1966).
134. Id. at 454.
135. See, e.g., Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968) (in which
Title VII proceedings dragged on for 16 months).
136. This power also includes requesting a special three-judge court to convene to hear
the case, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-6 (b) (1964).
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Title VII Procedures as Contrasted with the Civil Rights Act of 1866
In Jones v. Mayer 37 the Supreme Court recently held that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 prohibits all racial discrimination in housing. It is likely,
therefore, that the 1866 Act is destined to have a significant impact in the
employment field as well. This anticipated impact stems from the similarity
between the section on which Jones was based 138 and the section of the 1866
1 39
Act covering employment, which states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts
.. as is enjoyed by white citizens.
In light of Jones, it is dear that denying or restricting an individual's
employment opportunity on racial grounds is an interference with his right
"to make and enforce [employment] contracts" and is forbidden by section
1981.140 The legislative history of section 1981 indicates an intent to end
41
private acts of racial discrimination, including employment discrimination,'
and this section has been specifically found to restrain discriminatory prac42
tices by a labor union.
A cause of action created by section 1981 is exclusively private and nongovernmental in nature, which is perhaps the major distinction between
section 1981 and Title VII. Three additional categories of distinction are:
(1) the classes of persons covered by the respective acts; (2) the availability
of immediate access to the courts; and (3) the substantive nature of the
144
prohibited acts. 143 Title VII excludes a number of classes of employees,
while section 1981 apparently applies to all employment situations.
Direct access to the courts is not allowed under Title VII,' 45 while under
section 1981 an aggrieved individual may sue without the necessity of
any prior governmental action. Title VII specifically proscribes certain
practices,' 6 while the substantive scope of section 1981 remains largely
undefined. 47 Moreover, an action under section 1981 is not affected by the

137. 892 U.S. 409 (1968). The relevant section of the 1866 Act reads: "All citizens of
the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed
by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property." 42 U.S.C. §1982 (1964).
188. 1866 Civil Rights Act §1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. §1982 (1964).
139. 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1964) (emphasis added).
140. See Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
141. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 129, 1159-60, 1833 (1866).
142. Dobbins v. Local 212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
1968).
143. Note, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil'Rights Act of 1866,
86 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 615, 622 (1969).

144. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e (b) (1964).
145. E.g., Pena v. Hunt Tool Co., 296 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
146. See 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2, 3 (1964).
147. Note, supranote 143, at 622.
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short statute of limitations governing Title VII actions, 148 but rather is
governed by the applicable statute of limitations of the jurisdiction concerned. 149 Finally, the 1866 Act is not limited to the remedies provided by
Title VII.150
Section 1981 complements Title VII and will especially benefit complainants who either fail to meet the strict procedural requirements of Title
VII or are excluded from its coverage. However, the financial burden of
maintaining a strictly private action' 5' may deter some plaintiffs from utilizing
152
this section.
Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a long overdue step by
Congress toward eradicating racial discrimination in employment.1 53 Its
effectiveness has been hampered by a number of factors, some common to all
anti-discrimination commissions, others resulting from the statutory provisions themselves. The EEOC should be given the power to issue cease-anddesist orders and to enforce these orders through the courts, and the complicated administrative procedures required to file suit under Title VII
should be simplified.154 Although Tide VII has been largely ineffective, it
could prove, with modification, to be a useful tool for eradicating discrimination in employment, especially when used in conjunction with private action
under section 1981.
PROCEDURES UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

Acr

Although the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), as amended, 155
has focused on other problems, 15 6 it has exerted a significant impact on the
effort against racial discrimination in employment and has a potential for
greater use in the future.'57 Although containing areas of exclusion,5 8 the

148. E.g., the 90-day limit for filing a charge. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (d) (1964).
149. See Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231, 233 (6th Cir. 1968).
150. Note, A "New" Weapon To Combat Racial Discrimination in Employment: The
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 29 MD. L. Rxv. 158, 171-72 (1969).

151. This burden, however, also falls on individuals wishing to pursue a judicial
remedy under Title VII.
152. Note, supra note 143, at 638.
153. See M. SovmRN, supra note 103, at 61.
154. See, e.g., Stebbins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 382 F.2d 267 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 910, rehearingdenied, 390 U.S. 976 (1967).
155. 29 U.S.C. §§151-68 (1964).
156. Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUm.
L. R v. 563 (1962).
157. Id. at 565.
158. Compare Rosenthal, Exclusions of Employees Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 4
IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 556 (1951), with Note, Racial Distrimination in Employment Under
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 615, 624-25 (1969). Perhaps the most important exclusion from the coverage of the Act is the category of "supervisors." 29 U.S.C.
§152 (3) (1964). Arguably, a Negro supervisor who was discriminated against could not bring
charges against the discriminator to the NLRB, but would have to seek an alternative
remedy. Cf. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 116 (2d
Cir. 1964).
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scope of the NLRA is much broader than that of Title VII, and is therefore
potentially more effective. Most cases under the NLRA have concerned union
discrimination, but, as discussed below, the Act can also be used effectively
against employers.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is constituted as the
agency primarily responsible for the enforcement of the Act. 59 Section 7 of
the NLRA enumerates the substantive employee rights protected by the
Act 160 and includes the rights (1) to self-organize, (2) to bargain collectively,
and (3) to engage in concerted activities - that is, striking and picketing.
Section 8161 sets forth various unfair labor practices, or violations of rights
guaranteed by section 7, and covers practices of both employers and unions.
The employer is forbidden generally "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees" in the exercise of rights guaranteed in section 7 .62 Employers
cannot discriminate against any employee because of union membership or
lack of it163 and cannot refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with the
union.164 The union is forbidden generally to "restrain or coerce" employees
in the exercise of section 7 rights.16 5 A union may not "cause or attempt to
cause the employer to discriminate against any employee" because of union
membership or lack of it,166 except in very restricted circumstances. 67 The
union also is under a duty to bargain in good faith. 168
In many respects, the NLRB procedures169 for processing claims of racial
170
discrimination resemble those of the EEOC, especially in the early stages.
The complainant must file a formal written charge (usually with one of the
regional directors of the Board) '7' within six months of the alleged discrimination.172 An investigation will ensue, and if probable cause is found,
7 3
a conciliation attempt will be made.

When these informal procedures fail to produce results, the differences
between the NLRA and Title VII become apparent. The NLRB issues a
4
formal complaint against the discriminating employer or labor union," and
159.
160.
161.
162.

See 29 U.S.C. §§153-56 (1964).
Id. §157.
Id. §158.
Id. §158 (a) (1).

163. Id. §158 (a) (3).
164. Id. §§158(a)(5), (d).
165. Id. §158 (b) (1).

166. Id. §158 (b)(2).
167. E.g., where the employee in a union shop has not paid lawful union dues. 29

U.S.C. §158 (b)(2) (1964).
168. Id. §158 (b) (3).
169. The procedures here described are applicable to all types of labor disputes, but for
the purposes of this note the description of their operation will be confined to cases involving racial discrimination.
170. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (1964).
171. National Labor Relations Act §10(b), 29 U.S.C. §160(b) (1964). Compare Civil
Rights Act §706 (d), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5 (d) (1964).
172.

A Cox & D. Box, CASES AND MAaRIALS ON LABOR LAW 162 (6th ed. 1965).

173. A. Cox &D. BOK, supra note 172, at 164.
174. 29 U.S.C. §160 (c) (1964). In extreme cases the Board may seek an injunction
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a formal hearing is held.1 75 If the Board finds the respondent guilty of the
alleged discrimination, it issues an order granting appropriate relief.17 6 If
the respondent is a union, the NLRB may rescind certification, refuse certification if it is being sought, or refuse to order the employer to bargain with
77
the unionY.
A Board order is enforceable through the federal courts of
8
appeals.17
Discrimination by Unions: The Duty of FairRepresentation
The NLRA has been widely used against employment discrimination by
labor unions.17 9 This utilization has been largely accomplished through the
duty of "fair representation," which the union owes all employees. The duty
arises because a union selected by a majority of employees in a unit appropriate for collective bargaining s 0 becomes the exclusive representation of all
employees in the unit.' s ' Any collective agreement negotiated by the union
binds all employees as well as the employer; L8 2 thus, the union has a duty
to represent fairly everyone in the unit.' 8 3 Once the union undertakes "to
bargain . . . for some of the employees" it represents, it cannot "refuse to
take similar action in good faith for other employees just because they [are]
84
Negroes."
The duty of fair representation has often been applied in finding that
a union has violated section 8 (b) (2) of the NLRA.185 There are basically
two categories of section 8 (b) (2) violations: (1) those stemming from racial
discrimination directed at nonunion members, 8 6 and (2) those concerning
preventing the continuance of the practice. 29 U.S.C. §160 (j) (1964).
175. The hearing is held before a trial examiner who recommends a decision to the
NLRB.
176. 29 U.S.C. §160 (c) (1964). This relief may include requiring the respondent to
cease and desist from the practice concerned. Affirmative relief such as hiring, reinstatement,
or back pay for the complainant may also be ordered. See, e.g., NLR.B v. Waumbec Mills,
114 F.2d 226, 235 (1st Cir. 1940).
177. See, e.g., Local 1, Independent Metal Workers Union, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964)
(rescission of certification).
178. 29 U.S.C. §160(e) (1964). See, e.g., Local No. 12, United Rubber, C., L. & P.
Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966). cert. denied, 389 U.S. 887 (1967).
179.

Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLuM.

L. REv. 563, 565 (1962).
180. The NLRB selected the appropriate bargaining unit as a part of its union certification process under §9(b) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §159(b) (1964).
181. Humphrey v. Moore, 875 U.S. 35, 342 (1964).
182. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 821 U.S. 32 (1944).
188. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 823 U.S. 192 (1944), which is the leading case concerning the duty of fair representation, arose under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§151-62 (1964), whose provisions are very similar to those of the NLRA in regard to employee's substantive rights. This doctrine was specifically applied to the NLRA in Syres v.
Local 23, Oil Workers Int'l, 850 U.S. 892 (1955), rev'g per curiam 228 F.2d 789 (5th Cir.
1955),rehearingdenied, 350 U.S. 943 (1956).
184. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
185. See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pacific Am. Shipowner's Ass'n, 218 F.2d 913, 917 (9th Cir.
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discriminatory treatment of workers who are union members. 187 An obvious
example of the first category is the discriminatory use of hiring halls. An
exclusive hiring hall agreement between an employer and a union is not
illegal per se, 88 but if such agreement is used to deny employment to nonunion members on racial grounds (or otherwise), an unfair labor practice
occurs. 18 9 The first category of section 8 (b) (2) violations occurs if workers
are denied union membership because of their race and then denied employment because they are not union members. 90 Such a denial of employment
could take the form of refusal to hire at all, or hiring Negroes only for lower
paying, low status jobs not desired by union members.' 91
The NLRB has also applied section 8 (b) (2) when Negro union members
were denied full enjoyment of union privileges, such as advancement on a
promotion list 19 2 or the right to process grievances. 93 The Board reasoned
that the duty of fair representation makes section 8 (b) (2) applicable in
these cases, 94 although that section concerns only discrimination to encourage
or discourage union membership. The rationale for this application is that
if a union causes an employer to discriminate on racial grounds, white
workers are encouraged to join the union and black workers are discouraged
from becoming union members. 95 While this interpretation of section
8 (b) (2) has been rejected by one court of appeals, 96 the Board has persisted
19
in it. 7
The duty of fair representation has also been applied in a few instances 98
to make racial discrimination by unions an unfair labor practice under
section 8 (b) (1) (A).199 In discriminating against nonmember black em1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930 (1955).
187. See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172

(2d Cir. 1963).
188. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
189. Cf. NLRB v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 279 F.2d 951 (8th Cir.

1960).
190. Sovern, supra note 179, at 569.
191. See, e.g., El Diario Publishing Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 965 (1955). When the employer's

shop became unionized the complainant, a Negro, was removed from his job as pressman
because he was not a union member. Since the policy of the union was not to admit Negroes
to membership, the Board found, inter alia, that the union had forced the employer to discriminate against the complainant because he was not a union member, in violation of
§8 (b) (2) of the Act. Id. at 974, 976-77.
192. Cf. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172

(2d Cir. 1963).
193. Local No. 12, United Rubber, C., L. & P. Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 317 (1964),
enforcement granted, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
194. But see Note, Allocating Jurisdiction over Racial Issues Between the EEOC and
NLRB: A Proposal, 54 Coauu, L. Rav. 943, 947 (1969) (arguing that §8 (b)(2) is not a
base for the doctrine of fair representation, but is practically coextensive with it).
195.

M. SOvm.N,

LEGAL

RESTRAINTS

ON

RACIAL

DISCRIMINATION

IN

EMPLOYMENT

168

(1966).
196.
197.
198.
199.

Cf. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
See, e.g., Local I, Independent Metal Workers Union, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
Sovern, supra note 179, at 594.
This section makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to restrain
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ployees, a union would seem to be clearly restraining or coercing employees
in the exercise of their section 7 rights of self-organization and collective
bargaining. As the exclusive bargaining representative for all employees in
the bargaining unit, the union cannot betray the trust of nonunion employees
by acting only for the benefit of its members.20 0 The right to fair representation, in effect, is a section 7 right of employees, and any breach of the union's
duty in this regard violates section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act and is an unfair
201
labor practice.
The same rationale is equally applicable when the victims of discrimination are black union members. The right to bargain collectively, guaranteed by the NLRA, section 8 (b) (3), presumably includes the right to share
in the benefits of collective bargaining, including the opportunity for advancement. When these benefits are denied or restricted on racial grounds,
the duty of fair representation is breached and an unfair labor practice
occurs.2 0 2 When the discrimination victims are union members, this rationale
seems more straightforward than that involved in attempting to employ
section 8 (b) (2) .203
The union's duty of fair representation makes racial discrimination a
violation of the union's duty to bargain in good faith.2 0 4 This duty extends
to members of the bargaining unit as well as to the employer,2 0 5 and if racial
discrimination touches any part of the collective bargaining process, the
union commits an unfair labor practice.2 0 6 It has been argued that the
union's responsibility of good faith bargaining falls outside the ambit of
the duty of fair representation,2o7 but the better view is that discrimination
bargained for by the union violates section 8 (b) (3) .208

or coerce employees in the exercise of §7 rights. 29 U.S.C. §158 (b)(1) (A) (1964).
200. Local 229, United Textile Workers, 120 N.L.R.B. 1700, 1708 (1968).
201. Cf. Steel v. Louisville 8: N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).

202. See, e.g., Local 12, United Rubber, Co., L. & P. Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
203. See text accompanying notes 194-196 supra.
204. Local 1376, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964); Cox, The Duty
of FairRepresentation,2 VLL. L. REv. 151, 173 (1957).
205. Note, Allocating Jurisdiction Over Racial Issues Between the EEOC and NLRB:
A Proposal,54 CORNELL L. REv. 943, 946 (1969).
206. See, e.g., Local 1, Independent Metal Worker's Union, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1577,

1604 (1964).
207. Id. at 1591-93 (dissenting opinion).
208. One argument used to support the contention that the duty of fair representation
does not encompass the obligation of good faith bargaining begins with the proposition that
union's bargaining duties under §8(b)(3) of the NLRA were intended to parallel exactly
those of the employer under §8 (a) (5). Since the employer obviously owes no duty to his
employees to represent them fairly, there is no parallel duty on the part of the union. The
basic premise of this argument is suspect, however. It may be argued that the union
unfair labor practices under §8 (b) of the NLRA were not intended to parallel employer
unfair practices contained in §8(a). For example, under §8(a) (1), an employer may not
"interfere with, restrain or coerce employees"; under §8 (b)(1), a union is not prohibited
from interfering with employees' rights but merely from restraining or coercing employees.
Thus, it would seem a union may interfere with employees' §7 rights to some extent. Also,
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
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Job applicants as well as employees in the bargaining unit may be
protected under the fair representation doctrine. Blacks who were not union
members were protected in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, a
Railway Labor Act case in which the Supreme Court stated:20 9
The Federal Act thus prohibits bargaining agents it authorizes from
using their position and power to destroy colored workers' jobs in
order to bestow them on white workers.
In effect, the opinion says that whenever a union deprives workers of jobs
because of race, its duty of fair representation is violated.210 A slight extension of this rule finds racial discrimination against job applicants objectionable.21
Racial Discrimination by Employers
While the NLRA has operated primarily against union discrimination,
it may also be used against racially motivated employer practices. It is an
unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate against any employee
by discouraging or encouraging union membership. 212 If the union is a party
to an exclusive hiring hall agreement that results in racial discrimination,
section 8 (b) (2) is violated,213 and the employer, the other party to the
agreement, is also guilty of an unfair labor practice.21 4 Likewise, if the
employer agrees with a union to discharge an employee because of his race,
he violates section 8 (a) (3). 215
Racial discrimination by an employer even without union pressure
violates the NLRA.21 In United Packinghouse Food & Allied Workers v.
NLRB the court held that racial discrimination by the employer was a per se

the duty of fair representation extends to union activities under §8 (b) (2), but not to the
complementary employer activities under §8 (a) (3).
209. 343 U.S. 768, 773 (1962).
210. Id. at 773-74. In Howard the victims of discrimination were black employees rather
than job applicants. Nevertheless, the union's duty of fair representation was held to extend
to individuals outside the bargaining unit. In view of this decision, no good reason is seen
for making a major distinction between nonunion employees and job applicants that would
protect one group from racial discrimination, but deny such protection to the other group.
211. Cf. Dillard v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 199 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1952). But see Todd v.
Joint Apprenticeship Comm. of Steel Workers, 223 F. Supp. 12, 18-19 (N.D. Inl. 1963),
vacated as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965) (dictum
that job applicants were not protected under the NLRA).
212. 29 U.S.C. §158 (a) (3) (1964).
213. See text accompanying notes 188-189 supra.
214. Cf. Richardson v. Texas & Northern O.R.R., 242 F.2d 230, 236 (5th Cir. 1957).
215. Central of Ga. Ry. v. Jones, 229 F2d 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848
(1956).
216. United Packinghouse Food & Allied Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
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interference with employee rights and therefore an unfair labor practice. 217
218
The court stated:
(1) [R]acial discrimination sets up an unjustified clash of interests
between groups of workers which tends to reduce the likelihood and
the effectiveness of their working in concert to achieve their legitimate
goals under the Act; and (2) racial discrimination creates in its
victims an apathy or docility which inhibits them from asserting their
rights against the perpetrator of the discrimination. We find that the
confluence of these two factors sufficiently deters the exercise of
Section 7 rights as to violate sections 8 (a) (1).
This rationale does not extend the ambit of section 7 to include a newly
enunciated right to be free from discrimination, 21 9 but merely holds that the
psychological effect of employer discrimination can interfere with employees'
rights to engage in concerted activities as guaranteed by section 7.220 Whether
a rationale based on psychological effects offers the best support for the
proposition that racial discrimination is a section 8 (a) (1) violation may be
questionable. However, the proposition appears sound under either the
United Packinghouse rationale or a "natural tendency" test.22'
Possible Conflict with Title VII and the EEOC
There is presently little conflict between the operation of the NLR.B
under the National Labor Relations Act and the EEOC under Title VII.222
The EEOC's lack of enforcement power prevents it from encroaching on other

217.

Id. at 1134; Comment, Employer Racial Discrimination as Unfair Labor Practice-

New Power for the NLRB, 57 Gao. L.J. 1313, 1316 (1969).
218. United Packinghouse Food & Allied Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1135 (D.C.

Cir. 1969).
219. See, e.g., Local 453, IAWV, 149 N.L.R.B. 482 (1964).
220. Comment, supra note 217, at 1314.
221. Id. at 1319.
222. The major area of potential conflict in this area is between the NLRB and state
and federal courts. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), held
that state and federal courts are preempted from hearing any case involving "activity [which]
is arguably subject to §7 or §8 of the Act." Id. at 245. Thus, it could be argued that since
racial discrimination is an unfair labor practice, courts have no jurisdiction to hear employment discrimination cases and that the NLRB is the sole tribunal for such matters.
However, the Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), rejected this preemption
doctrine as applied to cases arising under the duty of fair representation. The court there
noted that the preemption doctrine had never been rigidly applied to cases "where it
could not fairly be inferred that Congress intended exclusive jurisdiction to lie with the
NLRB." Id. at 179. The decision to preempt federal or state courts from considering a
certain class of cases "must depend upon the nature of the particular interests being asserted and the effect upon the administration of national labor policies of concurrent
judicial and administrative remedies." Id. at 180. The importance of providing alternative
remedies for victims of discrimination and the tradition of court activity in remedying
employment discrimination would certainly foreclose any adoption of the Garmon preemption doctrine in this area.
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agencies' jurisdictions. It has been suggested, however, that if the EEOC
were empowered to issue cease-and-desist orders, a significant overlap
22
between the powers of the two agencies would result. 3
If the EEOC were given such power, it is argued that the NLRB's jurisdiction should be narrowed, especially in cases arising under the "fair representation" doctrine.224 Since the EEOC would have authority to deal with
unions that discriminate, multiple government agencies operating in the same
area would create undesirable problems of coordination, planning, and possible disparate remedies. 225 The problem of possible conflict is thus not one
of conceptual inconsistency in the acts, but of the administrative difficulty
involved in meshing the provisions of the various statutes. 226 The likelihood
that the EEOC will receive these powers seems remote, however, but even if
administrative overlap did occur, the effectiveness of the national policy
against racial discrimination would be further advanced by a comprehensive
accommodation between the two agencies, than by severely limiting the
jurisdiction of the NLRB. Although close coordination between government
agencies is difficult, it can be accomplished .- 7
It has also been argued that the passage of Title VII preempted the
NLRB from the entire area of racial discrimination. 228 The suggestion is
that by failing to insert a provision to preserve remedies under other federal
statutes, as it did in respect to state anti-discrimination laws 229 and laws
dealing with veteran's rights, 2 30 Congress by implication displaced existing
remedies under the federal labor statutes. 231 This reasoning, however, appears
fallacious. The power of the NLRB to adjudicate cases involving racial discrimination in employment was well established long before passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.232 Moreover, in view of the lack of support for
this proposition, in either the words of the statutes 23 3 or their legislative history,23 4 it is unlikely that Congress intended by implication to preempt the
223. See Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair Representation and the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 49 MINN. L. Rxv. 771 (1965).
224. Note, Allocating Jurisdiction Over Racial Issues Between the EEOC and NLRB: A
Proposal,54 CORNELL L.Q. 943, 950 (1969).
225. Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 HARv. L. REv. 684, 690 (1965).
226. See Sherman, supra note 223, at 772.
227.

See Blumrosen, The Newport News Agreement - One Brief Shining Moment in the

Enforcement of Equal Opportunity, 1968 U. ILL. L. F. 269, 277-79. But see Farmer, Equal
Employment Opportunity -Case Study of Chaotic Administration, 44 FLA. B.J. 400 (1970),
contending that uncoordinated efforts by several government agencies to end discrimination
at the Crown Zellerbach plant in Louisiana had actually hindered the elimination of discrimination.
228. Sherman, supra note 223, at 805.
229. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-7 (1964).
230. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-l1 (1964).
231. Sherman, supra note 223, at 805.
232. See, e.g., Larus & Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945).
233. The Senate rejected an amendment that would have expressly made Title VII the
exclusive means of dealing with racial discrimination in employment. 110 CONG. RaEc. 13171
(1964).
234. See BuREAu OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE CIvIL RIGrHTs AcT OF 1964, at 41 (1964).
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NLRB from this area. The courts have rejected this argument, holding that
Title VII did not effect a repeal, in whole or in part, of any of the NLRA
235
provisions dealing with remedial powers of the Board.
Advantages of Using the NLRA Against Discrimination
The NLRA possesses several advantages as a means of attacking employment discrimination. First, the NLRB is an established, well-funded
agency, 23 6 while the EEOC is relatively new and untried, having operated

for only five years. Most state agencies also have inadequate budgets237 and
lack the prestige of the NLRB. Arguably, employers would more seriously
regard an investigation by the NLRB, with its known readiness to utilize
its coercive powers, than they would to an EEOC inquiry. In this respect,
the "extra weight" of the NLRB may itself psychologically compel discriminators to cease the offending practice voluntarily.
In addition, the power of the NLRB to order and enforce appropriate
relief through the courts already exists. 23 In contrast to Title VIL239 no new
legislation is necessary to make the NLRA an effective weapon against racial
discrimination. When the difficulty of enacting any new national measure
dealing with the enforcement of human rights is considered,2 40 the advantage
of using existing legislation becomes obvious. Further, the NLRB, rather
than the complainant himself, carries the financial burden of fighting discrimination. A plaintiff in a private suit under the 1866 Civil Rights Act
or under Title VII bears the entire expense of maintaining the action. These
expenses can be considerable and undoubtedly deter individuals from seeking judicial redress.241 Even in a class action, where expenses may be spread
among class members, the expense of giving notice 242 may still be prohibitive.
Nonetheless, several adverse factors limit the effectiveness of the NLRA.
Like those of the commissions discussed above, 243 NLRB procedures, includ235. United Packinghouse Food & Allied Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. United States, 368 F.2d 12, 24 (5th Cir. 1966),
enforcing 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967), rehearing denied, 389
U.S. 1060 (1968).
236.

See J. WrrzERSPOON, ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 162, 519

(1968).
237. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
238. See 29 U.S.C. §160 (1964).
239. See Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement
Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REV. 834, 847 (1969), for
proposals to amend Title VII to increase its effectiveness.
240. See generally 115 CONe. REC. 803 (daily ed., July 15, 1969). H.R. 6228 and 6229,
which would have given the "cease-and-desist" powers to the EEOC, were introduced but apparently died in committee.
241. See Note, Racial Discrimination in Employment under the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 86 U. Ci. L. REV. 615, 638 (1969).
242. FE. R. Civ. P. 23 (b).
243. See Lefkowitz v. Farrel, 9 RAcE REL. L. REP. 393 (1964) (case took approximately
3 years to reach a final result), af'd sub nom., State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Farrel,
43 Misc. 2d 958, 252 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, N.Y. 1964). The culmination of the
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ing appeals, often require an inordinate amount of time to reach a meaningful
result.244 While protracted litigation in the employment area is but one facet
of the over-all problem of crowded court dockets,245 the impact is especially
severe since by the time a delayed final decision is promulgated, many complainants may no longer be able to benefit from it. Also, it should be noted
that the high costs of prosecuting a court action, plus the weight given
administrative decisions,246 mean that complainants are usually unable to
seek judicial reversal of a dismissed complaint. 247 In this regard, a plantiff
who elects NLRB procedures should also realize that in the event of an adverse Board decision, he may be held to have waived his rights under other
248
statutory provisions.
AFFiRmATiVE ACriON REQUIREMENTS: THE PHILADELPHIA PLAN

On June 27, 1969, the Assistant Secretary of Labor promulgated the
revised Philadelphia Plan,249 basically requiring building construction contractors to take positive steps to remedy the absence of minority workers in
the building trades. 250 Although the operation of the Plan is restricted to the
Philadelphia area, its impact may be nationwide.
Background of the Plan
During the national mobilization immediately prior to World War II,
Negro groups began to urge the federal government to counter employment
discrimination. Executive Order No. 8802,251 promulgated in 1941, barred
racial discrimination in the performance of all defense contracts. 25 2 Because
the need for vigorous federal action has not diminished since 1941, the

extensive litigation was finally reached when the New York Court of Appeals affirmed- the
final order against the union. State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Farrel, 19 N.Y. 2d 974,

228 N.E.2d 691 (1967).
244. See Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897, enforced, 368 F.2d
1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert .denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
245. See Warren, Dedicatory Address, 21 U. FLA. L. Rav. 285, 287 (1969).
246. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
247. M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESRAINITS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINASON IN EMPLOYMENT 24 (1966).
248. See Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 300 F. Supp. 22 (WD. Pa. 1969), rev'd,
424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1970).
249. Memorandum, Revised Philadelphia Plan for Compliance with Equal Employment Opportunity Requirements of Executive Order 11,246 for Federally-Involved Construction, BNA LAB. REL. Rir. 2544a (1969) Lab. Rel. Expediter [hereinafter cited as Plan]. The
original Philadelphia Pre-Award Plan went into effect Nov. 30, 1967. Because of disappointing results in abating the effects of discrimination, special measures were deemed necessary

to provide equal employment opportunity in the specified trade. Id. at 2544b.
250. 115 CONG. REC. 8836 (daily ed. July 30, 1969) (remarks of Senator Javits).
251.

3 C.F.R. 957 (Supp. 1938-1943).

252. The present orders are lineal descendants of Exec. Order No. 8,802; Exec. Order
No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 406 (1969), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. III, 1967); Exec. Order No. 11,478,
3 C.F.R. 133 (Supp. 1969).
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original order has been followed by a series of Executive orders dealing with
253
discrimination in government contracted employment.
Executive Order No. 11246254 presently in force, 23 5 expands the original
order in both the substance of the non-discrimination obligation and the
number of contractors subject to it.256 The order requires that all federal
financial aid applicants incorporate a general non-discrimination clause into
federal contracts, subcontracts of federal contractors, and federally aided construction contracts. 257 Contractors must take "affirmative action" to ensure
that job applicants and employees are treated "without regard to race, creed,
color, or national origin." 258 Contractors must also guarantee that their subcontractors will take similar affirmative action.259 An Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) was created under the Secretary of Labor to be
260
primarily responsible for enforcement of the order.
Subsequently, the Secretary of Labor 261 issued regulations clarifying the
affirmative action requirement. 262 Each prime contractor with fifty or more
employees and a contract of 500,000 dollars or more is required to develop
a written affirmative action compliance program. These programs must contain, as a minimum, an analysis of all major job categories, with an explana263
and affirmative
tion if minorities are being under-utilized in any category,
action commitments that are designed to correct any identified deficiencies
in minority employment. 264 Where deficiencies exist and where numbers or
percentages are relevant in developing corrective action, these commitments
must include specific goals of minority employment percentages and timetables for fulfilling these goals.2 65 Prime contractors must require substan266
tially identical programs of their subcontractors.

253. E.g., Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 87 (Supp. 1961).
254. 3 C.F.R. 406 (1969), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. I 1967).
255. Part I of Exec. Order No. 11,246, dealing with nondiscrimination in government
employment, was superseded by Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 133 (Supp. 1969).
256.

Note, Executive Order 11,246: Anti-Discrimination Obligations in

Government

Contracts, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 590 (1969).
257. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 406 (1969), 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. I1 1967).
258. 3 C.F.R. 406 (1969).
259. Id. at 406.
260. 31 Fed. Reg. 6921 (1966).
261. The Secretary of Labor retains the rule-making power for the OFCC. 31 Fed. Reg.
6881, 6882 (1966).
262. 41 C.F.R. §60-1.40 (1970). This affirmative action concept was expanded in 35
Fed. Reg. 2586 (1970).
263. Several factors are considered in determining whether minorities are "under
utilized," among which are (1) the size of the minority population in the labor area
surrounding the facility, (2) the size of the minority unemployed force, (3)the percentage
of the employer's minority work force compared with the total work force in the surrounding
area, and several others. 35 Fed. Reg. 2586, 2587 (1970).
264. Id. at 2588.
265. Id.
266. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 406 (1969).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1970

25

REVIEW
UNIVERSITY
OF
FLORIDA
Florida
Law
Review,LAW
Vol. 23,
Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 8[Vol. XXII

Provisions of the Philadelphia Plan
The revised Philadelphia Plan was issued to implement the somewhat
abstract "affirmative action" requirement because special measures were
needed in the Philadelphia area to provide equal employment opportunity
in several construction trades. 267 The Plan requires that when the estimated
cost of a construction project in the Philadelphia area subject to Executive
Order No. 11246 exceeds 500,000 dollars, each bidder must "commit [himself] to specific goals of minority manpower utilization.."268 The OFCC
considers several factors2 69 and determines a range of minority employment
27 0
that would normally result from a good faith, affirmative action program.
Rather than vaguely promising affirmative action, a contractor must set a
goal of minority employment within this range in his bid. He must earnestly
attempt to meet this goal, but may not discriminate "in reverse" against any
27 1
qualified applicant or employee on racial grounds.
27 2
If the contractor fails to meet the goal, he receives an opportunity to
demonstrate that he made "every good faith effort" to meet his commitment; and if this showing is made the requirements of the Plan are satisfied.
His failure will not be excused because the union with which he has a collective bargaining agreement failed to refer minority employees. 27 3 The Plan
notes that discrimination in employment violates both the NLRA and Title
VII and that contractors cannot delegate the responsibility for their em27 4
ployment practices to the union hiring hall.
267. See note 249 supra.
268.

Plan note 249 supra, §4.

269. (1) The current extent of minority group participation in the trade; (2) the availability of minority group persons for employment in such trade; (3) the need for training
programs in the area and the need to assure demand for those in existing training programs, or both; (4) the impact of the program upon the existing labor force. Plan note 249

supra, §6.
270. See Guidelines on Order Amending PhiladelphiaPlan Relating to Minority Group

Employment Goals, BNA LAB. REL.REP,. 2544g Lab. Rel. Expediter (1969). After setting forth
findings concerning minority group participation, availability of minority group representatives for employment, and impact of the program upon existing labor forces, a range of
minority group employment for each trade was promulgated. These ranges escalate each year
until 1973. Id. at 2544k, 25441:

Ironworkers
Plumbers
Steamfitters
Sheetmetal Workers
Electrical Workers
Elevator Workers

1970

1971

1972

1973

5-9
5-8
5-8
4-8
4-8
4-8

11-15
10-14
11-15
9-13
9-13
9-13

16-20
15-19
15-19
14-18
14-18
14-18

22-26
20-24
20-24
19-23
19-23
19-23

271. Legality of Revised PhiladelphiaPlan,42 OP. ATrr'y GEN. No. 37, at 6 (1969).
272. Plan note 249 supra, §8 (a). Failure of any subcontractor to achieve his goal will
be treated as a failure by the prime contractor.
273. Plan note 249 supra, §8 (b).
274. Id. See also Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 15 Ohio Misc. 289, 295,
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The enforcement system for the Philadelphia Plan is provided by the
Executive order.275 When a contractor submits a bid that does not comply
with the invitation to bids issued pursuant to the Plan,276 the bid will be
rejected as not responsive.2 7 7 If the contractor's affirmative action plan is
accepted, but he does not comply with it, the OFCC will attempt through
informal conferences to persuade him to do so.2 78 Cancellation of the contract
and prohibition from further participation in any federal contract 279 are
the ultimate sanctions.280

Legality of the Plan
The plan has been characterized as requiring a "quota system" for
hiring minority group employees. 28 1 Such a quota system, it is argued, is
"reverse discrimination," violating both the constitutional requirements of
equal protection and due process2 8 2 and Title VII.2 3 Opponents claim that,

by requiring preferential treatment of minorities, the Plan forces contractors
to discriminate against white persons, thus infringing their constitutional
rights and violating Title VII. These contentions were given weight by the
Comptroller General of the United States, who expressed the opinion that
the provision for commitment to specific goals of minority group employment conflicts with Title VII.284
Title VII forbids any form of discrimination on the basis of race in
hiring and specifically states that the Act should not be interpreted to require
redress of existing racial imbalances. 28 5 Under present law the OFCC probably could not require contractors to hire or train a specific number or
percentage of employees from minority groups. 288 If the Philadelphia Plan
imposes such a preferential hiring requirement, its validity probably could
28
not be sustained. 7
238 N.E.2d 839, 843 (C.C.P. Cuyahoga County, Ohio 1968), aff'd, 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249
N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970).
275. Plan note 249 supra, §8 (a).
276. Plannote 249 supra, Appendix (2).
277. 42 Op. Ar'Y GEN. No. 37, at 11 (1969).
278. 41 C.F.R. §60-1.24 (c)(2) (1970).
279. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 406 (1969). 42 U.S.C. §2000e (Supp. III 1967).
280. Note, supra note 256, at 602. If a contractor is found "nonresponsible" more than
once for failure to comply with equal employment opportunity requirements, proceedings
will be instituted at the culmination of which he may be declared ineligible to bid on
further contracts. 35 Fed. Reg. 2587 (1970).
281. 115 CONe. Riec. 8836 (daily ed. July 30, 1969) (remarks of Senator Javits).
282. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The requirement of equal protection of the laws, as expressed in the fourteenth amendment, applies to the federal government through the
operation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S.
497 (1954); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
283. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (a) (1964).
284. 42 Op. A'rr'y GEN. No. 37, at 4 (1969).
285. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §703 (a) (1), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (a) (1) (1964).
286. Lambert, Affirmative Action: A Robin Hood Hiring Policy in Federally Aided
Construction, 2 PRospEcrus 183,190 (1968).
287. 42 Or. Arr'y GEN. No. 37, at 6 (1969).
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A federal district court, in Contractor's Association v. Secretary of Labor,288 emphatically rejected the contention set forth above, that the Philadelphia Plan is illegal.289 Holding that the provisions of the Plan are not in
conflict with Title VII, the court stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the executive orders under which the Plan was promulgated have a
common purpose-to assure all an equal chance of employment. "Discriminatory obligations are not its [the Plan's] intent."2
The Philadelphia Plan obviously requires more than mere non-discrimination; the federal contractor must affirmatively ensure adequate minority
participation in his federally funded project. General policies of passive
non-discrimination have proved insufficient to ensure equality of employment opportunity for minority groups in areas where racial discrimination
has been a pattern or practice.2 91 The effects of such patterns remain, perpetuating discrimination and even concentrating its past effects. 29 2 Measures
to eliminate the effects of past discrimination as well as that of the present
and future have been strongly approved by the courts.2 93 To hold that
efforts to eradicate these lingering effects are constitutionally beyond the
power of the Executive would largely emasculate the government policy
4
against racial discrimination in employment.29
A distinction must be drawn between those things prohibited by Title
VII and those things that are merely not required by that Act.295 In concluding that the Plan was legal, the United States Attorney General stated:2 98
Nothing in the Philadelphia Plan requires an employer to violate
section 703 (a). The employer's obligation is to make every good
faith effort to meet his goals. A good faith effort does not include any
action which would violate section 703 (a) or any other provision
of Title VII.
Nothing in the language or legislative history of Title VII suggests that
affirmative action, above and beyond what Title VII requires of employers
generally, may not be required of federal contractors under the Executive

288. 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
289. Other arguments rejected by the court included the contention that the Plan
was unconstitutional as an arbitrary classification based solely on artificial geographical
boundaries, that the authority to order such sweeping social changes is reserved to the
legislature and may not be so exercised by the Executive, and that the Plan was arbitrary
and capricious in directing its force against contractors and not against unions, who are
chiefly responsible for the evil. Id. at 1011-12.
290. Id. at 1009.
291. See generally 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2513-17.
292. See United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, 282 F. Supp. 39
(E.D. La. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
293. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
294. See Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002, 1011-12 (E.D. Pa.

1970).
295. 42 Op. ATr'y GEN. No. 37, at 5 (1969).
296. Id. at 6.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol23/iss1/8

28

Caldwell:RACIAL
Implementing
Governmental
Against Racial Discrimination in
DISCRIMINATION
IN Policy
EMPLOYMENT
order and the regulations. 20 7 Assuming that preferential hiring agreements
would violate Title VII, it may be contended that the Plan is not such an
agreement. Requiring the employment of a specified number of minority
group members may be prohibited, but it may be argued with equal force
that although good faith efforts to meet goals within a reasonably drawn
range are not required by Title VII,298 neither are they prohibited by it.
Even assuming that the Philadelphia Plan does constitute a preferential
hiring agreement, it may be argued that Title VII does not forbid it. The
contention that such an agreement is prohibited rests on the position that
the contractor's "good faith" obligation subsumes deliberate efforts by him
to affect the racial composition of his work force. This necessarily would
involve making race a factor in obtaining employees, and any such action
arguably violates Title VII.299 The Attorney General, however, believes that
Title VII does not prohibit employers from making race a factor at any
stage in the process of obtaining employees:3 00
[T]he Constitution does not require and, in some circumstances, may
not permit obliviousness or indifference to the racial consequences of
alternative courses of action which involve the application of outwardly neutral criteria.... Title VII does not prohibit some structuring of the hiring process, such as the broadening of the recruitment base, to encourage the employment of members of minority
groups.
Perhaps the key argument against the contention that the Plan constitutes reverse discrimination is the Plan's specific statement that the contractor's commitment to specific goals "is not intended and shall not be used
to discriminate against any qualified applicant or employee. 30 The Plan
does not require contractors to hire a definite percentage of minority workers,
but merely requires that good faith efforts be made to meet employment
goals. 30 2 If, in spite of the contractor's good faith efforts, his goal of minority
participation cannot be fulfilled, qualified nonminority applicants may be
hired 30 3 and the provisions of the Plan are satisfied.
The Philadelphia Plan is not different in kind from the affirmative
action required of federal contractors since 1961;304 it varies only in the degree
of specificity concerning what constitutes effective affirmative action. The
imposition of requirements such as these by Executive order has been held
a valid exercise of Presidential authority. 305 Moreover, Title VII itself has

297.
298.
299.
800.
301.
302.

See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (a) (1964).
Id.
42 0e.ATr'Y GEN. No. 37, at 7 (1969).
Id.
Plan note 249 supra, §6 (b) (2).
Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002, 1010 (E.D. Pa. 1970).

303.

42 Op.Arr'y GEN. No. 37, at 8 (1969).

304. See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 87 (Supp. 1961).
305. Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1967); accord, Farmer
v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964).
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been held to require more than passive non-discrimination in eliminating
306
the effects of past discriminatory practices.
[he
Act casts upon those subject to its provisions not merely the
duty to follow racially neutral employment policies in the future but
or revise practices which would perpetuate
an obligation to correct
3 0
racial discrimination. 7
Thus, failure to take steps to eliminate practices that perpetuate the present
effects of past discrimination constitutes an illegal discriminatory act.308
Likewise, affirmative action has also been approved by courts in cases involving other aspects of discrimination. For example, a school board has been
required to take affirmative steps to ensure that the ratio of white to black
teachers in each school is substantially the same as the system-wide ratio. 309
The concept of classification by race where necessary to repair the effects of
past discrimination has been applied to housing3 10 and voting rights cases. 311
Thus, the revised Philadelphia Plan would not seem to be "reverse discrimination" denying equal protection312 or due process to either employers
or nonminority employees.3 13 It is a proper way to satisfy the urgent
necessity of promoting true equality in the industries concerned.3 1 4 Although
its scope is extremely narrow, 31 5 the impact of the Plan may well be substantial. If more successful than other efforts, this concept may be extended
into a nationwide program implementing Executive Order No. 11246.310
CONCLUSION

Government measures against racial discrimination, while widespread,
have generally yielded disappointing results. The commissions, both at the
state and federal levels, have been unable to cope with the task thrust upon
them. State statutes are generally adequate on their faces, but state commissions are often handicapped by insufficient funds, a lack of aggressive
personnel, and the absence of coordinated statewide efforts to attack discrimination. The main defect at the federal level is the statute itself, Title
306. See Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d
980 (5th Cir. 1969); Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
307. United States v. Local 86, Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123, 127 (8th Cir. 1969).
308.

Note, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Minority Group Entry Into the

Building Trade Unions, 37 U. Cm. L. Rav. 328, 338 (1970). But see United States v. Local
88, IBEW, 59 CCI Lab. Cas. 19226, at 6919 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
309. United States v. Montgomery County, 895 U.S. 225 (1969).
310. E.g., Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 980 (2d Cir. 1968).
311. E.g., Gaston County v. United States, 895 U.S. 285 (1969).
312. Cf. Garfunkel & Cahn, Racial-Religious Designations,Preferential Hiring, and Fair
Employment Practices Commissions, 20 LAB. L.J. 357, 871 (1969).
318. See Lambert, note 286 supra.
314. 115. CONG. Rac. 8837 (daily ed. July 80, 1969).
315. See text accompanying note 268 supra.
316. See Policy Statement, Labor Department's Role in Civil Rights Disputes, BNA

LAB. REL. Rat,. 2544 Lab. Rel. Expediter (1969).
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VII, which restricts commission activity in both its coverage and the remedies
it affords.
Barring major revision of Title VII, which appears unlikely, continued
emphasis on the role of the NLRA and an expansion of the Philadelphia
Plan type of affirmative action program appear to offer the most hope for
effective government actions. Placebos in the form of additional ineffective
statutes or high-sounding policy statements will not ameliorate this "repugnant, unworthy, and . . . unpalatable situation."'31 What is needed is a
coordinated, well-organized program at all levels of government, headed by
aggressive officials and with the support of the President, governors, mayors,
city and county commissioners, and other officials.
The policy is clear, however, the question remains whether society is
capable of implementing that policy through the law. If not, victims of
discrimination may increasingly be expected to turn to self-help as the only
effective means of alleviating the burden of discrimination. A federal district
court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has said: 318
The strength of any society is determined by its ability to open doors
and make its economic opportunities available to all who can qualify.
It is fundamental that civil rights, without economic rights, are mere
shadows. These two rights... when realized will bring into full play
that protection to which our Constitution and statutes are dedicated.
The law must not be permitted to fail in this vital area. A conscious
effort is needed to make the law truly responsible to national needs.
JAMES

R.

CALDWELL,

JR.

317. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002, 1012 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
318. Id. at 1010.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1970

31

